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1.1 The scope of study and current interest 
 
This study will aim to assess the degree to which the Agreement on the European Economic Area
1
 is a 
sustainable legal model for the future. The parties to the Agreement are the European Union
2
 and the 
members of the European Free Trade Association.
3
 The agreement which gives the EFTA states 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway  access to the EU internal market, has developed in a manner 
which could not be foreseen when it was signed in 1992. This is especially visible regarding how the 
EEA Agreement is interpreted in compliance with EU law, and the results will be examined in this 
study. 
The scope and functioning of the legal criteria in the EEA agreement is of relevance today for multiple 
reasons. First of all, Norway has as the first EFTA State
4
 evaluated the EEA Agreement to discover 
how the EEA Agreement is serving national interests. Liechtenstein has started a similar process as 
well.
5
 As a reply, the EU will do the same.
6
 
Secondly, for the first time since 1995, changes within the EFTA block may happen. In 1995, Finland, 
Austria and Sweden left the EFTA, and since then the member states have been Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. Currently, Iceland is negotiating for EU membership and may leave the EEA 
agreement. Meanwhile, other European states have examined the EEA agreement when assessing their 
own relationship with the EU. The degree of state sovereignty may be decisive for their view 
regarding the legal structure of the EEA Agreement and thus if they want to participate or not. The 
question arises as to whether the EEA agreement is a judicial model strong enough to survive these 
present tendencies. This demands an examination of the main legal characteristics of the agreement. 
Thirdly, the overreaching principle of legal homogeneity within the EEA Agreement will be put to the 
test if the ‘right of reservation’ in article 102 is used for the first time in terms of the Third Postal 
Directive.
 7
  Whilst the process may highlight the sometimes contradictory nature of the principle of 
legal homogeneity and state sovereignty, the outcome may be vital to the future of the EEA 
Agreement. These are some of the aspects that the study will cover, and the topic to be approached is: 
                                                          
1
 Agreement on the European Economic Area, Official Journal No L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3, hereinafter the ‘EEA 
Agreement’ 
2
 Hereinafter the ‘EU’ 
3
 Hereinafter ‘EFTA’ 
4
 Norway: NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ (Official report on the assignment from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) 
5
 Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, 3060
th
 General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14
th
 
December, para 34 
6
 Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, 3060
th
 General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14
th
 
December, para 34-36 
7
 Joint Press statement ‘Informal EU-Norway consultations on the 3rd Postal Directive’ 
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Does the principle of homogeneity and lack of legal influence impair the legal structure of the EEA 
Agreement? 
In order to answer this question, the outline of this study will contain assessments of some legal 
aspects of the EEA agreement where homogeneity may impair its legal function. Although it was clear 
from the beginning that the EEA Agreement included a transfer of a set of limited powers to the EFTA 
institutions
8
, no powers were to be transferred to the EU organs. Firstly, the study will thus assess the 
extent to which EU constitutional principles are present in the EEA Agreement. The EFTA States shall 
be exempted from this sort of EU integration, having chosen not to become members of the EU. In this 
evaluation the interpretation of the EFTA Court will be of vital importance. 
Secondly, the study will assess article 102 of the EEA agreement. This article regulates the 
amendment procedure of the EEA Agreement. This article will also serve as an example for the 
different comprehensions regarding the balance of the principles of sovereignty and homogeneity. 
Two practical examples will be given in order to provide different angles of the comprehension of this 
procedure. 
In the third section, to what extent the EFTA States may influence the EU legislative process will be 
examined. The lack of influence is a criticised feature of the EEA Agreement in the EFTA states, and 
it is suggested that the influence is not sufficient to retain the sovereignty of the EFTA States. The 
influence given through the EEA Agreement will be assessed in addition to other channels of 
influence, in order to give a complete presentation as necessary within the frames of this research. 
Where examples from an EFTA State are beneficial, it will be from a Norwegian view. This is because 
Norway is the first EFTA State that has completed its review of the EEA Agreement, as well as 
decided to use the ‘right of reservation.’ 
The fourth section will examine how other European States view the EEA Agreement. For third 
parties, the legal function of the agreement is of vital importance in an agreement which aims to 
integrate the contracting parties into the legal structure of the EU. Thus, the balance of homogeneity 
and sovereignty will be decisive, as the main difference between an EU member state and an 
EFTA/EEA state is the transfer of legislative powers. Furthermore, the participation of new 
contracting parties to the EEA Agreement may be important for its sustainability. 
Last, there will be suggestions on how to overcome those aspects that weakens the legal function of 
the agreement, in order to have a sustainable EEA agreement. 
This study will not cover the influence and consequences of the four freedoms in the EFTA/EEA 
states, nor the degree to which the EEA agreement has been beneficial for the contracting parties, even 
                                                          
8
 As an example, the EEA Agreement had to be incorporated into Norwegian legislation through the 
Constitution article 93, which allows such a transfer to an organization where Norway is a member. 
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though this is also decisive regarding future participation in the Agreement. Alternatives to the EEA 
agreement will not be a substantial part of this paper, despite this being closely related. The focus of 
this study is rather improvements within the present structure due to the fact that neither Liechtenstein 
nor Norway has sent signals of withdrawal. 
 
1.2 Key concepts and definitions 
 
Switzerland is also a part of EFTA, but not to the EEA Agreement. As the topic is the EEA Agreement 
and its contracting parties, the term ‘EFTA State’ will be used for Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland. 
In the preamble to the EEA agreement, the objective is defined as a ‘homogeneous European 
Economic Area’. Homogeneity means identical. Thus, rules within the EEA shall have identical 
application, meaning in this regard that there shall be no legal distinction between EU member states 
and EFTA/EEA states. The aim of homogeneity is also visible in the EEA agreement article 6. 
According to the latter article, the interpretation and application of the Agreement by the EFTA Court 
must be done ‘in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’.  Thus, the EFTA Court must respect relevant rulings of the ECJ in order to ensure 
homogenous application of the EEA agreement. 
Another governing principle in the EEA Agreement is the sovereignty of the EFTA/EEA states. 
Sovereignty includes having self-governance, being independent and being its own permanent 
authority. Sovereignty is a power possessed by a state in its ability of being a state. The EFTA/EEA 
states remain sovereign as they have not formally transferred legislative powers to the EU organs, as is 
the case for the EU member states. 
 
1.3 Historic background 
 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was founded in 1960, under the Stockholm convention, 
between Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria.
9
 The 
background for the establishment was to create a trade partner to the European Community (EC) for 
those European states who did not want to become EC members. In 1977, EFTA consisted of 7 states; 
Iceland, Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Liechtenstein and Norway, and in comparison with 
EC’s 9 member states
10
 there was an equal balance between the two blocks. In 1989 Jacques Delors, 
                                                          
9
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ p 46  
10
 Ibid p 47 
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president of the EC Commission, formally announced the idea of a structured partnership with EFTA, 
based on ‘common decision-making and administrative institutions… to create a dynamic and 
homogenous European economic space’.
11
 The prime ministers of the EFTA States then gathered in 
Oslo, Norway to discuss an answer. 
As the European Community was planning the internal market, the EFTA States realized that they 
could not afford to be left out. The Norwegian Prime Minister had argued to the Norwegian Storting 
about the necessity to strengthen the cooperation with the EC and the problems that would otherwise 
occur.
12
  EFTA was already trade-dependent on the EC; between 1972 and 1986, intra-EFTA imports 
decreased from 15.5 % to 13.3 %, while EFTA imports from the EC had increased from 59.4 to 61.1 
%.
13
  The development continued, and in 1992, for example the Norwegian export of oil and gas to the 
EC represented 2/3 of the oil and gas export in total.
14
 The dependence on the EC market and the risk 
related to being left out of the development, increased simultaneously. 
The EFTA States demanded exemptions and influence, but few of them were accepted.
15
 According to 
the NOU 2012:2, these demands should be seen as purely tactical moves,
16
 though such demands are 
reasonable for a state who seeks participation in an intergovernmental agreement.  As a compromise, 
the parties stated in a joint declaration that ‘this framework should inter alia respect in full the 
decision-making autonomy of the parties’.
17
 During the process, the EC was clear on the fact that they 
would not give up their single and independent right to legislate, and that the EFTA States were 
supposed to take over all Aquis Communitaire (aquis).
1819
 Due to the nature of EC law, sharing the 
legislator competence is not a legal possibility. As a result, no transfer of legislative powers was given 
from the EFTA States to ‘any institution of the European Economic Area’, according to the preamble 
of Protocol 35 to the EEA agreement. 
The negotiations between the EU and the EFTA States started in June 1990. The discussions regarding 
influence and exemptions contributed to a change of the EFTA view on the status of the agreement. 
                                                          
11EFTA commemorative publication  ‘15 years EEA agreement European Economic Area 1994-2009 ‘ Extract 
from Delors speech to the European Parliament  17th of January 1989 p 11 
12
 St.meld.nr. 61 ‘Norge, EF og europeisk samarbeid’ (1986-1987) referred in NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and Outside’ p 
49 
13
 Cedric Dupont ‘The Failure of the Nest-Best Solution: EC-EFTA Institutional Relationships and the European 
Economic Area’  Chapter 4 p 9 
http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Cedric%20Dupont,%20Chapter%204,%20Aggarwal%20Institutional%20
Design%20book.pdf accessed 23.03.2012 
14
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’, p 60 
 
16
 Ibid p 62 
17
 Joint Declaration following the EFTA-EC ministerial meeting (Brussels December 19
th 
1989) p 25 Joint 




 The term within the EU means 'the EU as it is – in other words, the rights and obligations that EU countries 
share’ http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm accessed 23.03.2012 
19
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’, p 52 
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During the negotiations, the view from many of the EFTA States changed from seeing the EEA 
Agreement as a permanent agreement to a temporary agreement on the way to full membership.
20
 




The negotiations lasted until October 1991. When the Agreement was accepted in the Norwegian 
Storting on May 15
th
 1992, the Minister of Trade, in contrast to the previous statement of Jacques 
Delores, acknowledged that the EEA agreement still could be an independent alternative, in addition 
to a foundation for further integration towards full membership.
22
 Against this background, the EEA 
agreement was signed in May 1992 in Porto, Portugal.   
The idea was to extend the internal market to comprise the EFTA States, meaning that EU law should 
also apply for the EFTA/EEA States. Meanwhile, already in the 1960’s, the EC court had established 




 of EC law, principles enforcing the supranational 
character of the EC. As the EEA agreement was an intergovernmental agreement, these principles 
were not applicable for the EFTA States. The EEA Agreement was EU law without certain 
characteristics of EU law. The EFTA States treated international law according to the principle of 
dualism, which requires that international law must be incorporated into the national legal system in 
order for it to have effect. This was also the method to be used for the EEA agreement. The latter is the 
opposite of direct effect, which requires a monistic approach. 
Until this point the character of the agreement was an international one, originally to be interpreted 
according to the Vienna Convention. This procedure was left out from the beginning. The agreement 
was both to be interpreted according to the principle of homogeneity and at the same time respecting 
the status of the EFTA/EEA states as sovereign. Consequently, the EEA agreement did not fall into 
any existing category of an international agreement. Some years later, in the EFTA Court case of 
‘Sveinbjørnsdottir’
25
  the EEA agreement was characterized as a an’ international treaty sui generis 
which contains a distinct legal order of its own…less far reaching than under the EC Treaty … the 




1.4 Legal nature and effects of the EEA agreement 
 
                                                          
20
 Ibid p 55 
21
 Ibid p 51 
22
 Ibid p 60 
23
 Case C-26/62  NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1 
24
 Case C-6/64  Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585 
25
 Case E-9/97 – ‘Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v Iceland’ [1997] EFTA Court Report 1998 p 95 
26
 Ibid para 59 
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As the EFTA/EEA states are sovereign, the EEA agreement is as a starting point an international 
agreement. As all the contracting parties to the agreement are dualist states, international legislation 
must separately be made a part of the national legislation in order for it to apply. This is in 
contradistinction to the EU member states, where monism applies. 
According to the EEA agreement article 7, there are two possibilities when integrating EU law into the 
national law of the EFTA/EEA states. According to article 7a, an ‘EEC regulation’ shall be made part 
of the internal legal order. A regulation is binding in its entirety. In Norway the implementation is 
secured through reference, according to the ‘EEA act’
27
 § 1.  There will be one sentence stating that 
the EU regulation applies as national law, in its original version. In addition to regulations, the EEA 
agreement is incorporated by reference. The advantage of this method is the elimination of differences 
in the national translation. Furthermore, it is easy to identify EU law, making the EU impact more 
visible. The latter argument also works as a disadvantage; as EU law stands out from the national 
legislation, EU law receives the status as foreign law. This may contribute to reluctance for people in 
general to accept EU acts as a part of national legislation. If the reference method was used for all 
amendments to the EEA agreement, the quantity of EU law in the national legislation would have 
become visible, which could have contributed to a more correct perception of the influence the EU has 
in the EFTA/EEA states today. 
The EEA agreement article 7b states that members may choose the incorporation method regarding an 
‘EEC directive’. In Norway this is done by translation of the EU act. This is a beneficial method for 
directives, because directives are binding only as to the aim. As long as the translation is loyal to the 
directive and clear in its choice of words,
28
 the tools and methods are free to be decided. As a result, 
some directives are transposed as law and others as administrative regulations. The negative aspects of 
this method, is that the visibility of what is originally EU law is not clear, despite some laws having 
footnotes to the original EU directive.
29
 When one cannot easily see the contribution of EU law into 
the national legal system, the debate regarding the EU is dependent on what the media and politicians 
publicly will discuss. On the other hand, the nature of EU law is not to distinguish itself from the 
national legal system as international law, but to form part of the national legal system. In the period 




                                                          
27
 LOV 1992-11-27 nr 109: ‘Lov om gjennomføring i norsk rett av hoveddelen i avtale om Det europeiske 
økonomiske samarbeidsområde’. 
28 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ p 121 
29
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’, p 121 for more details 
 
30 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’, p 793 
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1.5 Problematic features of the EEA Agreement 
 
A consequence of the principle of dualism is that the EEA Agreement is formally treated as other 
international agreements by the EEA/EFTA states. However, one problematic issue is that some 
decisions by the EFTA Court imply that the principles of direct effect and supremacy, both aspects of 
the EU’s supranationality, have been used in order to respect the aim of homogenous interpretation. 
This is not compatible with the status of the EFTA States as sovereign. The use of direct effect and 
supremacy may influence the agreement’s sustainability as well as the possibility for other states to 
join the agreement. 
Another issue criticised by the EFTA/EEA citizens is the lack of influence in the EU legislative 
process. Despite the EU being sole legislator, the EFTA/EEA should as sovereign states, have 
influence in the legislative process. However, in the EEA Agreement there are certain provisions 
ensuring the EFTA States influence on the legislative process. These articles are targeted towards the 
most important organ when the Agreement was signed in 1992; the Commission. When the balance of 
power between the EU organs changed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EEA 
agreement has not been amended accordingly. The intended influence may have been weakened, 
presumably contributing to the fact that the EFTA/EEA states are losing their sovereignty a little by 
little. 
In the following, these problematic features will be examined. The existence of direct effect and 
supremacy among others will be addressed through the case law of the EFTA Court. Then these 
principles and their interaction will be examined though the amendment procedure, and in the light of 
the degree of influence in the legislative procedure. Last, these features will be viewed from other 
European States. 
2 EU constitutional principles in the EEA Agreement 
 
2.1 The jurisdiction of the EFTA Court 
 
The establishment of an EFTA Court is required in the EEA Agreement article 108 (2). As a 
consequence of direct effect not being applicable for the EFTA States, the EFTA Court shall ensure 
the correct application of the EEA Agreement in the EFTA States. Despite EU law being identically 
applied in the whole European Economic Area, the EFTA States enjoy a different position compared 
to the EU member states in terms of legislative powers and sovereignty. Consequently, the legislation 
in the EEA Agreement must be applied different in the EFTA States to a certain degree, leaving the 
EFTA Court a degree of independence. 
11 
 
The question is whether the principle of homogeneity and the influence of ECJ case law prevail over 
the EFTA States and their sovereignty to such an extent that the independent role of the EFTA Court 
may be doubted. 
The jurisdiction of the EFTA Court pursuant to article 32 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement
31
 is 
to rule ‘in actions concerning the settlement of disputes between two or more EFTA States regarding 
the interpretation or application of the EEA Agreement’. The mandate of the EFTA Court pursuant to 
the preamble of SCA is to ensure ‘uniform interpretation and application of the EEA Agreement’. This 
will pursue ‘equal treatment’ for the EFTA/EEA citizens with the EU citizens, in terms of the four 
freedoms and competition. These criteria favour a homogenous interpretation with ECJ rulings. 
Additionally, the Court must ensure that the EFTA States refrain from measures ‘which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement’, article 2 (2). This article raises the 
threshold for non-homogenous behaviour, as all measures which risk the homogenous application can 
represent a breach of the Agreement. Instead of acknowledging that the interpretation in some cases 
will be different due to the special framework of the EEA Agreement, this obligation stresses the aim 
of homogeneity. This criterion raises the threshold for the EFTA Court to divert from ECJ 
interpretation, and weakens the independence of the EFTA Court. 
The judges in the EFTA Court shall be chosen among persons ‘whose independence is beyond doubt’, 
(SCA article 30). The judges’ independence safeguards that they will not act biased to their home 
EFTA state. Meanwhile, there are no references in the SCA to the independence of the EFTA Court.  
In comparison, the independence of EFTA Surveillance Authority
32
 whose task is to ensure the EFTA 
States does not breach the EEA Agreement, is mentioned both in the preamble and in article 4 (1). 
Consequently, the overarching objective of the EFTA organs is ensuring compatibility with EU law, 
highlighted by the fact that the sovereignty of the EFTA States and independence of the EFTA Court 
is not mentioned. When independence is not expressed combined with the guidelines ensuring 
homogeneity, the EFTA Court cannot be said to enjoy a full independent status. 
The framework and structure of the EFTA Court is modelled upon the one of the European Court of 
Justice.
33
 Although, while decisions from the ECJ are binding upon the member states pursuant to 
TFEU
34
 article 274, the rulings of the EFTA Court are only ‘advisory’, (SCA article 34 first 
paragraph). This is a consequence of the fact that the EFTA/EEA states have not transferred legislative 
                                                          
31
 Hereinafter ‘SCA’. 
32
 Hereinafter ‘ESA’ 
33
 Hereinafter ‘ECJ’. 
34 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 




powers to the EFTA Court, as opposed to the EU member states and the ECJ. Formally, sovereignty of 
the EFTA States is secured. Meanwhile, there are implications that their decisions are closer to being 
binding in reality. As an example, the Norwegian Supreme Court gives their interpretation 
‘preeminent weight.’
35
 If the national court does not interpret the EEA Agreement in the same manner 
as the EFTA Court, which leads to a different application of the rule in question than envisaged by the 
EFTA Court, ESA will most likely bring the EFTA State in front of the EFTA Court due to lack of 
proper implementation of the EEA Agreement, (SCA article 31 (2)). 
Pursuant to the EEA Agreement article 6, the EFTA Court must interpret the EEA Agreement ‘in 
conformity’ with the rulings of ECJ. An interpretation of the criteria gives the same content as 
homogeneity. Furthermore, the obligation to interpret in conformity with relevant ECJ decisions, only 
apply to rulings ‘prior to the date of signature of this Agreement.’ The EFTA Court is, according to 
this article, not bound by the ECJ decisions after 1992. Decisions before 1992 are binding, which 
includes the rulings of ‘Van Gend en Loos’ and ‘Costa/ENEL’, which introduced direct effect and 
supremacy into the European Community. Even though these principles do not form part of the EEA 
Agreement, this article does leave the door open to use these principles in interpretation of the EEA 
Agreement. 
If the article was to be read isolated, the limited scope of time could apply. However, interpretation ‘in 
conformity’ must be viewed as an expression for homogeneity. The latter is an overall principle which 
is not restricted in time. Therefore, it can be argued that decisions after the signing of the Agreement 
are equally binding. This is supported by the view of the Norwegian Supreme Court which give all 
rulings of the EFTA Court ‘preeminent weight’.
36
 
Under Article 3 II of SCA, the EFTA Court must pay ‘due account to the principles’ in any relevant 
ECJ decision. Thus, the EFTA Court shall also consider pure EU principles when interpreting the EEA 
agreement. The results of paying due account these principles, remains uncertain. If it means that these 
principles shall be used, EU principles such as direct effect could have an indirect legal base in the 
EEA agreement. In the case of Norway, it has never been a situation where the lack of EU principles 
in the EEA agreement has been decisive for the result.
37
 This fact may imply that that the EFTA Court 
does make use of purely EU principles in the interpretation of the EEA agreement, where this is 
necessary in order to safeguard a homogenous application of EEA law. 
                                                          
35
 Tor-Inge Harbo ‘The European Economic Area Agreement: A case of Legal Pluralism’ Nordic Journal of 
International Law 78 ‘(2009) pp 201-223, at 205-206 
36
 Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen ‘One market, Two Courts: Legal Pluralism vs Homogeneity in the European 
Economic Area’ Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010)pp  481-499 at 488 
37
 Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen ‘One market, Two Courts: Legal Pluralism vs Homogeneity in the European 
Economic Area’ Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010)pp  481-499 at 490-491 
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The EFTA Court is only bound as to the result of an ECJ decision.
 38
 This means that the EFTA Court 
can reason on other grounds than the ECJ, making the Court independent in this manner. However, the 
EFTA Court judge Carl Bauenbacher, states that in practise it is not possible to interpret the articles in 
the EEA agreement different from the interpretation of the ECJ.
39
 He further states that this means that 
‘the basic structure and governing principles’ of the EU internal marked, developed by the ECJ, have 
been transposed into the EEA agreement.
40
 Examples are fundamental freedoms of competition and 
State aid provisions.
41
 This means that the EFTA Court ensures the dynamic function of the EEA 
agreement, as stated in the preamble. 
As the EFTA Court is only bound by ‘relevant’ rulings, they are free to interpret EEA law in issues 
where there is no precedence. The question becomes if the Court in these situations will try to follow 
the ECJ on alternative grounds, or if they will rule solely on grounds of the EEA agreement. 
A study performed by ECJ judge Christian Timmermans, showed that the EFTA Court has possibly 
gone beyond the aim of following the ECJ only where there is concise precedence, but extensively 
applying legal grounds from the ECJ which are not required to obtain homogeneity.
42
 This 
characteristic is called ‘creative homogeneity’.  If the EFTA Court is likely to follow the ECJ 
precedence to a greater extent than the EEA agreement demands, the agreement becomes more 
homogenous than needed, possibly negatively affecting the EFTA States position as sovereign states. 
On the other hand, in the case of ‘LO’
43
 the EFTA Court held that collective agreements in some 
regard are sheltered from the cartel prohibition, despite the ECJ having previously ruled that such 
agreements fall outside the scope of formerly Article 85.1 TFEU. Also in recent cases regarding the 
free movement of services, the EFTA Court has assessed the criteria in a different way than the ECJ.
44
 
This implies that the principle of sovereignty can prevail over homogeneity on a case by case basis, 
which will preserve the sovereignty of the EFTA States. 
2.1.1. Concluding remarks 
                                                          
38 Carl Baudenbacher  ‘The goal of homogenous interpretation of the law in the European Economic 
Area’ The European Legal Forum (e) 1-2008, 22-23, 2008 IPR Verlag GmbH München p 23 
39
 Carl Baudenbacher ‘The goal of homogenous interpretation of the law in the European Economic Area’ The 
European Legal Forum (e) 1-2008, 22-23, 2008 IPR Verlag GmbH München p 23 
40
 Ibid p 23 
41
 Ibid p 23 
42
 Christian Timmermans ‘Creative Homogeneity, Festchrift for Sven Norberg’, 2006, 471 in Carl Baudenbacher 
‘The goal of homogenous interpretation of the law in the European Economic Area’ The European Legal Forum 
(e) 1-2008, 22-23, 2008 IPR Verlag GmbH München p 23 
43
 Case E-8/00 ‘LO (Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions) with NK (Norwegian Union of. Municipal Employees) 
v KS (Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities) EFTA Court report [2002] 114 para 35 
44
 Case E-1/06 – ‘EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway’ [2007] EFTA Court Report p 8 
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The EFTA Court interprets and applies the EEA Agreement guided by its principles and accordingly 
to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. When the SCA only provides a legal base which safeguards 
homogenous interpretation, the EFTA Court is bound to let homogeneity prevail in order to fulfil their 
mandate. It is peculiar that homogeneity is mentioned in several articles, while the independence of the 
EFTA Court is not codified, so as not to interfere with the goal of homogeneity. 
This fact can be seen as a result of the unequal balance of power during the negotiations for the EEA 
agreement with the EU as the stronger block. Consequently, the EFTA states are not fully sovereign, 
despite the fact that they have not formally transferred legislative powers to the EU organs. When the 
Norwegian Supreme Court gives the EFTA Courts interpretation ‘preeminent weight’, there has been 
an indirect transferral of powers. 
The faithful interpretation to ECJ decisions may have increased the legitimacy of the EFTA Court 
from an EU point of view, implied by the increasing reference to the EFTA Court by the ECJ.
45
 Thus 
it has probably contributed to the sustainability of the EEA Agreement. On the other hand, a recent 
study of the EFTA Court case law concluded
46
 that in cases of doubt, the EFTA Court favours even 
more integration of the states than the ECJ. It cannot be said to be proportionate if the EU states who 
even have a voice in the decision making process, have more freedom than the EFTA states. 
Legislative power is therefore in some extent given from the EFTA states, through the EFTA Court 
and to the EU organs. Not explicitly, but through the conditions and principles for the EFTA Court in 
the EEA Agreement and in the Surveillance and Court Agreement. Homogeneity is the principle that 
prevails in these agreements, and which decides whether there has been a breach. Consequently the 






Supremacy, or primacy, within the EU is a principle developed through teleological interpretation
47
 of 
the EU Treaty by the ECJ.
48
 Supremacy ensures the prevalence for EU law over the law of the member 
states. As the ECJ stated in the case of ‘Costa-E.N.E.L’, EU law ‘could not, because of its special and 
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original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions’.
49
 Supremacy of EU law is a consequence 
of the transferral of legislative powers from the member states to the EU. If the member states had 
retained their sole power to legislate, there would be no reason for EU law to automatically prevail. 
In cases of conflict between the EEA agreement and the law of the EFTA/EEA states, ‘the EFTA 
States undertake to introduce… a statutory provision to the effect that EEA rules prevail in these 
cases” (Protocol 35 of the EEA agreement). The wording expresses that the EFTA States, as with the 
other EEA states, must ensure that EEA law prevails over national law in cases of conflict. Despite the 
fact that the EFTA/EEA states have not conferred legislative powers to the EU, EU law must still 
prevail. Presumably, this is based on similar reasoning as for the EU member states; the nature of EU 
law. 
Meanwhile, the original comprehension in Opinion 1/91 given by the ECJ is clear on the fact that 
supremacy does not exist in the EEA agreement.
50
 This is consistent with the EFTA States not having 
formally transferred legislative powers to any EU or EFTA institution. Still, supremacy has been 
accepted by the EFTA States as they have incorporated such an obligation in their national system, 
such as the ‘EEA Act’ in Norway.
51
  
The existence of supremacy in the EEA Agreement was confirmed in the EFTA Court case of 
‘Einarsson’.
52
 This case regarded the interpretation of the EEA agreement related to differentiated 
value-added tax. The EFTA Court concluded that EEA rules, which gave individuals rights that could 
be invoked in front of national courts, would prevail over national legislation in cases of conflict.
53
 
The applicability of supremacy in the EFTA pillar has been called ‘quasi-primacy’.
54
 Meanwhile, as it 
is clear that the EEA Agreement must prevail in cases of conflict and the fact that this principle will 
only apply in cases of conflict, the principle of supremacy will have identical effect for the EEA 
Agreement as for the EU Treaty. This is an important aspect when assessing the character of the EEA 
agreement itself; even though the agreement may seem as an agreement with its own character because 
of the lack of transfer of powers, the agreement includes an aspect which is decisive for the 
supranational character of the EU. 
 
2.2.1 Remarks 
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Supremacy seems to have been a precondition to ensure effective applicability of the EEA Agreement 
in the EFTA States, contrary to what is the situation with the Free Trade Agreements, for example 
between EU and Switzerland. The formal difference to supremacy in the EU is that a legal base for the 
principle of supremacy had to be implemented into the national legislation. This is contrary to the EU, 
where the ECJ stated that supremacy applied and then the principle had direct effect into the national 




2.2 State liability 
 
As the State can be liable on the grounds of national law, so can the State be liable on the grounds of 
implemented EEA law. Despite the principle of dualism in the EFTA/EEA states, there is an 
established principle of state liability for non-implemented directives in the EFTA/EEA states. In the 
EFTA Court case of ‘Sveinbjørnsdottir’
55
 the court assessed whether the principle of state liability for 
breach of EU law had an equivalent in the EFTA/EEA states. The factual circumstances were that Ms 
Sveinbjørnsdottir had been given notice in a machine factory. In the notice period she claimed for 
unpaid wages but was refused on the grounds that she was the sister of the 40% shareholder in the 
factory, and therefore not a priority.
56
 She claimed this was a breach of Community law due to a non-
implemented directive and demanded compensation from the State. The question was whether such a 




The principle of dualism should prevent state liability when the directive is not transposed into the 
national legal system. Despite this, the EFTA Court takes a teleological approach and assesses if the 
legal base can be found in the objectives of the EEA agreement. The grounds for this teleological 
approach, is that the EU principles cannot be exported into the EFTA/EEA national states.
58
 The Court 
highlights that state liability is not contrary to the system of the EEA Agreement.
59
 Furthermore does 
the Court not object to the plaintiff’s argument regarding that state liability in this case is supported by 
the EFTA States’ responsibility for individual damages caused by incorrect implementation.
60
  
First of all, it must be noted that the EFTA Court chose not to ground this state liability for non-
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implemented directives on conformity with the interpretation of ECJ case law based on EEA article 
6.
61
 If article 6 was used, it would be clear that the EFTA Court imports principles from the EU. By 
using the objectives in the EEA agreement itself, the formal independence of the EFTA Court and 
sovereignty of the EFTA States are ensured, as the Court has not expressly imported anything from the 
EU. 
Secondly, teleological interpretation is a characteristic aspect of EU law, not stated in the EEA 
agreement nor used by the EFTA Court earlier. When this method is used by the EFTA Court to 
interpret the EEA Agreement, this method forms part of the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. As 
a result, an EU principle is transferred from the EU into the EEA Agreement. 
2.3.1 Remarks 
The result of the introduction of state liability into the EFTA/EEA national legal systems is that 
despite the wording in the articles, the EEA agreement is open for developments that are difficult to 
foresee. When a teleological assessment is used, the EEA Agreement may be open to all EU principles 
that are necessary to ensure homogeneity in the specific case. Further, the principle of dualism, which 
is important in relation to the formal sovereign status of a state, becomes a secondary priority when the 
aim of homogeneity prevails. 
2.4 Direct effect 
 
Direct effect is a principle created by the ECJ
62
 and which forms part of the supranational character of 
the EU legal system. Direct effect means that an EU citizen may derive rights from an EU regulation 
and directive from the time it is published in the Official Journal, (TFEU article 297 second 
paragraph). This means that the effectiveness of regulations and directives is not dependent on the 
implementation into the national legal system of each member state. Directives only have direct effect 
between private citizens, so-called vertical direct effect.
63
 
Direct effect of EU legislation applies for the EU member states. If this principle was comprised in the 
EEA agreement, full homogeneity would be ensured in terms of application of the internal market 
rules. Meanwhile, the exemption for direct effect in the EEA agreement is a consequence of the EFTA 
States’ lack of transfer of legislative powers to EU institutions. 
In an EFTA/EEA state, the EEA agreement has direct effect for private citizens, because the main part 
is implemented in national law, pursuant to the principle of dualism. To the extent that directives and 
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other legislation are also implemented in the national legal system, they will also bind the citizens. The 
difference to EU law is that regulations and directives that are not approved in the EEA Committee are 
not binding to any extent and directives approved in the Committee but not implemented by the EFTA 
state, are only binding for the State. (EEA Agreement article 104). 
In the EFTA Court case of ‘Restamark’
64
 the subject matter was whether the import monopoly in 
Finland
65
 contradicted non-implemented EEA law. The Court had to decide whether article 16 of the 
Agreement was sufficiently unconditional and precise, so it would produce direct legal effect
66
. These 
criteria are the threshold for direct effect within the EU for secondary legislation. Article 16 EEA was 
in substance identical to article 37 EC, of which it was already established met the criteria of 
unconditional and was sufficiently precise to give rise to direct effect. Consequently, due to article 6 
EEA, the principle of equal treatment and the aim of homogeneity, article 16 EEA had direct effect.
67
 
The judgement shows that implemented EEA acts can have direct effect in the EFTA/EEA states. The 
notion has been called ‘quasi-direct effect’,
68
 because of the lack of an explicit legal basis. Meanwhile, 
the effects are no different from within the EU. 
In the Norwegian Supreme Court case ‘Finanger I’
69
 the question was whether a wrongfully 
implemented directive could have horizontal direct effect in Norwegian legislation, meaning direct 
effect between private parties. The background was that Norwegian law reduced the liability from the 
insurance company when the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated 
with alcohol. The EC Motor Vehicle Directive did not have this exemption, implying that if the 
directive had been implemented correctly or given direct effect, the injured party, here Ms Finanger, 
would have received full compensation. The majority of the Supreme Court voted negatively to the 
directive having horizontal direct effect. As directives do not have horizontal direct effect within the 
EU, the homogeneity principle was not an argument. The question remains what would have been the 
result if the case concerned vertical direct effect for the implemented directive. 
The EFTA Court case of ‘Sveinbjørnsdottir’ implemented the doctrine of state liability of non-
implemented EU law in the EEA agreement. This principle was confirmed in the EFTA Court case 
‘Karlsson’.
70
 In the latter case, the Government of Norway presented the argument that the principle of 
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state liability under EU law was inseparable from the principle of direct effect, and therefore could not 
apply in the EEA agreement.
71
 This argument was not heard, because the reasoning for state liability 
was based on the objectives of the EEA agreement itself. 
Arguably, there are reasons to comply with the Government’s argument. That the Norwegian State 
shall bear the responsibility based on a directive that is not a part of Norwegian Law, ultimately refers 
to the doctrine of direct effect, which shall not apply. As Haukeland points out, this is an example of 
the EFTA Court trying to minimise the practical consequences due to the lack of direct effect, in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of EEA law in EFTA states.
72
 
On the other hand, one can arguably consent with the EFTA Court. As homogenous application is the 
overall objective, it is likely that direct effect will be necessary in some situations in order to reach this 
objective. Thus, direct effect may implicitly be found in the objectives of the EEA Agreement. 
Despite the non-existing clause or directly spoken direct effect, it seems clear that the doctrine is 
invoked for the EFTA states through the demand of homogeneity. 
2.4.1 Concluding remarks 
Although direct effect is not formally a part of the EEA agreement, and other conditions such as 
dualism support this fact, it is arguable that an indirect legal base for direct effect is found in SCA 
article 3 (2). Regardless of this, direct effect had its entry into the EEA agreement in the case of 
‘Restamark’ and later ‘Sveinbjørnsdottir’. The introduction of direct effect in the agreement is also a 
consequence of the homogeneity objective and its prevalence in SCA. Due to the lack of an explicit 
legal base, direct effect was interpreted into the preconditions in the EEA agreement. The EFTA Court 
was not wrong in this assessment. EU law and therefore EEA law are formed on the basis that they 
will have direct effect in the member states. In order to obtain homogeneity with ‘relevant’ rulings of 
the ECJ, it cannot be excluded that direct effect may be necessary. This especially applies when there 
is no other principle with equal weight to balance out the principle of homogeneity. 
On the other hand this method of interpretation is arguably contrary to the purpose of the Agreement, 
when direct effect was not made a part of the EEA Agreement. If principles in the EU may be 
exported into the EEA Agreement, the principle of legitimate expectations
73
 should have protected the 
EFTA states from the use of direct effect. 
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2.5 Homogeneity or legal pluralism? 
 
Case law of the ECJ influences the decisions of the EFTA Court, pursuant to SCA article 32 and EEA 
Agreement article 6. The EFTA Court decisions influence the national systems, as an example the 
Norwegian Supreme Court gives the preliminary rulings of the EFTA Court ‘preeminent weight’. 
Consequently, there is a monologue from the ECJ through the EFTA Court which ends in the national 
legal systems of the EFTA/EEA states. 
When the ECJ assesses general principles within the Union, the national legal systems can be a 
valuable source. There is no explicit legal base in the EEA agreement which expresses a room for a 
dialogue, meaning that the national legal systems in the EFTA/EEA may influence the EFTA Court. 
Despite of the previous, some authors claim that there is in fact an implicit dialogue between the 
EFTA Court and the EFTA States’ national legal systems.
74
 In the following, some EFTA Court cases 
will be examined to locate if there are legal grounds to this perception.  
In ‘Piazza’
75
, regarding compatibility of the Civil Code in Liechtenstein with the EEA Agreement, the 
EFTA Court made a reference to the ‘good functioning of the legal systems …common principle in the 
constitutional structure of the EEA Contracting Parties’.
76
 Here the Court explicitly refers to the 
national system of an EFTA state, making its principle of ‘good functioning’ a part of their judgement. 
However, as pointed out by Fredriksen
77
 it would be premature to conclude that EFTA legal systems 
are now a legal source for the EFTA Court. Additionally pointed out, is that the ‘good functioning’ 
principle can safely be assumed to form part of all EEA national systems. As long as the EFTA 
national system does not bring a new legal source into the interpretation of EEA law, it cannot be 





 case concerned the prohibition to sell beer with high alcohol content from retailers 
other than the Wine Monopoly. The EFTA Court used reasonableness as a ground not to doubt the 
Norwegian Government’s intention behind the Wine Monopoly.
80
 Because of the explicit reasoning, 
author Harbo
81
 is of the opinion this is due to a willingness of the EFTA Court using a Norwegian 
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court-made doctrine when assessing Norwegian cases. A contesting view is given by Fredriksen,
82
 
who states that the EFTA Court is only following the doctrine of the ECJ.  
When the same principles are used and the result is identical, the aim of homogeneity is not harming 
the sovereignty of the EFTA States. Nonetheless, a dialogue between the EFTA Court and the national 
courts regarding implementing new parameters cannot with certainty be stated to exist. If the EFTA 
Court was to introduce new legal parameters into the interpretation of EEA law, the homogeneity 
would be at risk. 
If the application of already existing EFTA principles are in fact an implicit dialogue, this would be a 
positive signal for the third states interest in EEA membership, as it would imply to a limited extent, a 
possibility for individual application. If legal pluralism was established through the introduction of 
pure EFTA/EEA principles, the legal structure and predictability would be secured, which are aims 
that should be pursued. 
2.6 Concluding remarks on constitutional principles in the 
EEA Agreement 
 
The legal principles in the EEA Agreement favour homogeneity with the interpretation of the ECJ. 
The opposite, legal pluralism, does not have a legal basis in the agreement. It may be questioned 
whether the EFTA Court is actually importing principles from the EFTA/EEA states. Meanwhile, the 
case law until today cannot confirm this tendency. This fact is supported by the statement of Judge 
Carl Baudenbacher, regarding the duty to interpret the EEA articles in the same manner as the ECJ. 
It would not be correct for Carl Baudenbacher to suggest otherwise, as the legal basis only approves of 
homogeneity. Consequently, a shift in direction of the interpretation of the EFTA Court must be based 
in the EEA Agreement. A change of the agreement demands approval from all contracting parties. 
These negotiations will be influenced by the political situation between the parties, which cannot be 
predicted. 
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Article 102 of the EEA agreement regulates the procedure when amending the agreement, as a result 
of a change in the community aquis. The two first paragraphs regulate the amendment procedure, and 
disagreements that arise during this process are solved according to the steps in paragraph 3-5. The 
latter procedure has by the EFTA/EEA states been referred to as the ‘right to veto’ or the ‘right of 
reservation’. 
In the following the legal nature of this article will be examined, as well as the normative discussion of 
how the agreement ought to be. 
3.2 Relevance as amendment criteria 
 
In the EEA agreement article102 first paragraph, ‘the EEA Joint Committee’ has the responsibility for 
amendments in the EEA agreement. The committee consists of representatives from the contracting 
parties
83
, thus from EFTA/EEA countries, as well as from the European Commission and the EU 
member states. 
The committee shall ‘take a decision concerning an amendment of an Annex to this Agreement’ 
(article 102 first paragraph). A decision concerning an amendment of the agreement is dependent on 
the existence of a relevant annex to amend. Thus there must be a legal basis in the EEA agreement 
before it can be amended. In other words, the EU legislative act must be relevant
84
  to the EEA 
agreement. 
Amendments of the EEA Agreement are done to ensure ‘simultaneous application’ with EU law, 
(article 102 (1)).  This aim corresponds with the objective in the preamble of the EEA agreement, 
which is a ‘dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area’. 
There are no further guidelines in article 102 to what makes an EU act EEA relevant. When legislation 
is officialised in the ‘Official Journal’, some are marked as ‘EEA relevant’. However, this is not 
legally binding and not always corresponding with the decisions of the Joint Committee.
85
 As a result 
the Joint Committee decides, without additional criteria, what will be subject to inclusion in the EEA 
agreement. After a publication of new EU law in the Official Journal, the EFTA secretariat releases 
standard forms to the EFTA/EEA states where the states estimate whether the act is relevant, and if 
they need legal or political adjustments.
86
 After this procedure, it is decided whether the legislation is 
EEA relevant or not. If it is relevant, it is implemented in the corresponding annex of the EEA 
Agreement. 
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Since the pillar structure was abolished by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the relevance assessment has 
become more uncertain.  According to NOU 2012:2 from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
there has been a tendency, regarding those acts that are not clearly relevant, to incorporate only those 
that are estimated to be beneficial for the states.
87
 This unintended margin of appreciation, contributes 
to retain the sovereignty of the EFTA states. Meanwhile, it also witnesses lack of legal criteria, 
resulting in unpredictability which was to some extent secured by the pillar structure. 
To make sure that the EEA agreement is amended according to relevant EEA legislation, the EU take 
tests
88
 to ensure the states’ cooperation. This far the EU has been content with the work of the Joint 




Neither the EFTA Court nor the European Court of Justice have jurisdiction in cases of conflict in 
these matters. If it was discovered that this discretionary power was used to avoid implementing aquis 
that opposed the EFTA/EEA states national interests, it would represent a breach of both the principle 
of homogeneity and the principle of loyalty in the EEA agreement article 3 (1). 
Additionally, from a political point of view, the EU is the powerful party to the agreement, which 
implies that their view would prevail in conflict. When politics have the possibility to prevail due to 
the lack of legal criteria, the results are often unpredictable. This must be considered a weakness in a 
legally binding agreement. 
The process of determining what is an EEA relevant act is thus not only a legal issue, but also an 
administrative and political one. This has several consequences. Firstly, the EEA agreement may come 
to contain more acts than legally predicted. Secondly, what the EEA agreement will contain in the 
future may depend on which states are party to the EEA agreement. Thirdly, it may depend on the 
political situation within each state and between the states within the Committee. This weakens the 
EEA agreement as a sustainable agreement open for accession to other states, as the agreement is not 
predictable. 
3.2.1 Remarks on the amendment procedure 
 
It is possible that a criterion for EEA relevance were not included in the agreement because it was 
clear that relevant acts in any case would find its legal basis in the EEA agreement. Meanwhile, as a 
result of the vast increase of EU policies and the abolition of the pillar structure, the separation is not 
evident today. 
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If the parties disagree on what is relevant, there is no established procedure for solving the problem. 
This is an interesting aspect, because when law is absent, politics will often fill in the gap, even if the 
act shall be interpreted pursuant to general principles in the agreement. The party who loses on such an 
arrangement, is often the weaker party, here the EFTA/EEA states. 
On the other hand, this construction creates a possibility for the EFTA/EEA states not to include 
certain EU acts. It is accordingly created a discretionary power that may secure the EFTA/EEA states 
more sovereignty than the EU member states. There is no equivalent mechanism in the EU system for 
the member states, because of the principle of direct effect. 
Meanwhile, the discretionary power gains its value only if it is used. This applies both for the current 
EFTA/EEA states and for potential future members. If the discretionary power is politically closed, the 
possibility in practise does not exist. Thus, it will not serve the sovereignty of the current members nor 
be an incentive for new states to participate in the EEA agreement. 
 
3.3 ‘Right of reservation’ 
 
3.3.1 Legal basis 
 
Article 93 of the EEA agreement states that the EEA Joint Committee ‘shall take decisions by 
agreement’. Because agreement must be reached, there will be a deadlock situation if one party 
dissents. Article 93 applies for all decisions made by the EEA Joint Committee, included the 
amendment procedure in article 102. In the EFTA States and in Norway for example, the general 
comprehension is that this means that the EFTA States has a right to oppose the implementation of an 
EU act, which does not suit their interest.  From this legal basis, the ‘right of reservation’ derives. 
Even though the legal criteria in these two articles do not contradict such an understanding, the right 
has never been used, as the threshold has seemed high. This procedure has even been compared to an 
atomic bomb, which ‘might be effective’ but ‘not very beneficial for anyone’.
90
 However, on the 23
rd
 
of May 2011 Norway gave formal notice to the EU communicating their willingness to make use of 
the right of reservation regarding the Third Postal Directive.
91
 If the EFTA/EEA states have a right to 
make a reservation against an EU act in practise, the EEA agreement could be more attractive for new 
states to join. The EEA agreement would then be a more distinct alternative to EU membership. 
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According to article 102 paragraph 3 of the EEA agreement, the first step in the procedure if 
agreement is not reached, is that the Contracting Parties shall ‘make all efforts to arrive at an 
agreement on matters relevant to this Agreement’. In this situation, the EEA Joint Committee shall ‘in 
particular, make every effort to find a mutually acceptable solution’ (paragraph 2).  From these criteria 
it is understood that the negotiations are an important aspect. Already at this point, the name ‘veto 
right’ or a ‘right of reservation’
92
 is not appropriate; it is not a definitive right to avoid an EU act, it is 
a right to negotiate for a mutually acceptable solution.
93
 
The 2012 report from the Foreign Ministry supports this interpretation of a negotiations procedure.
94
 
The opposite opinion is put forward by the organisation ‘Nei til EU’ (No to the EU).
95
  In their 
opinion, article 102 does not facilitate a negotiation procedure, but expresses a sole right of reservation 
that the EU must accept. As the wording however is clear on the point that the parties shall negotiate, 
this must be regarded as a political statement rather than a legal one. 
Due to the high threshold in the article not to reach an agreement, the presumption is that most 
disagreements will end at this stage. This would be the most beneficial for both parties in most 
situations, in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the agreement. 
If a solution is not found, ‘the EEA Joint Committee shall examine all further possibilities to maintain 
the good functioning of this Agreement and take any decision necessary to this effect…’ according to 
paragraph 4. The wording emphasizes the high threshold for not agreeing on amendments. This 
process may last a maximum of six months (article 102). Before starting this limited period of time, 
the parties may have been negotiating for a long time. It is not until this deadline is made effective, 
that the negotiation procedure officially starts. All criteria thus facilitate the aim of finding a solution. 
3.3.2 Absence of legal criteria 
 
Whether it is correct to interpret a right of reservation into these articles, or if it is merely an 
opportunity to negotiate the content or extent of an EU act, there is a lack of criteria for reaching the 
threshold of this procedure. Compared to national laws in general, this is an unusual construction 
where filling the criteria is essential to give effect to a legal remedy. In international law as well, 
criteria are naturally used to protect the sovereignty of a state. As an example, EU member states may 
limit the scope of EU legislation if they threaten public safety, public health or security, for example in 
the area of freedom of persons, workers and capital, pursuant to TFEU chapter one article 45, 3. 
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Another example is the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which operates with similar 
thresholds as public health and security, freedom and morals (see for example ECHR article 9, 2). 
From an EU point of view, it would serve the aim of homogeneity if it was only in certain areas the 
EFTA States could start a negotiation procedure. As the situation is now, the EFTA states may 
negotiate all EU acts. When there are no legal criteria that follow the negotiations procedure, other 
parameters for when it is appropriate to negotiate will fill the gap, most likely the political 
environment. The consequence is that this procedure has never been used in the lifetime of the EEA 
Agreement, which serves EU interest but not the interests of the EFTA states. If the meaning was to 
have a right of reservation as comprehended by the EFTA states, the right is diminished due to the 
lack of criteria.   
There is no obvious reason for why a reservation against law that threatens national vital interest or 
public morals should not be an applicable possibility for the EFTA/EEA states. On the contrary, 
because the EFTA/EEA states are not EU members, they should be granted more independence than 
the member states. 
On the other hand, because the participation is limited to the internal market, the agreement would be 
of lesser value for the EU if the EFTA States could block legislation without being a member. The 
agreement is well functioning now partly because the EFTA/EEA states do not represent a problem
96
 
or vastly increased workload for the EU; the most recent figures show that all the three EFTA/EEA 
states are below the transposition deficit of 1 %. The EU states are not below 1.2%.
97
 In the 2010 
Council Conclusion
98
 the Council encouraged Norway to ‘maintain the same good record in the 
coming period’
99




Meanwhile, the result is that the EFTA/EEA states have less independence than the EU member states 
in this regard, lacking criteria that can be assessed as basic elements for a sovereign state. 
Furthermore, the ‘right of reservation’ becomes illusionary without criteria. This view is supported by 
the fact that the ‘right of reservation’ has never been used. Furthermore, the use of the procedure is 
likely to depend on the political situation between the EU and the EFTA block, or the domestic 
political situation, like the pressure of using this right in Norway today. 
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3.3.3 Legal consequences 
 
The procedure expresses a right for a party to the EEA agreement to have a dissenting opinion 
regarding the implementation of EU legislation, which may lead to differences in content in the same 
legal areas within the EU and the EFTA/EEA. If it is a right for the EFTA states to prevent the 
implementation of an EU act, and its nature being contrary to the objective of homogeneity, it cannot 
legally be considered as a breach of the agreement. The right can be read from the conditions in the 
article 93 and 102. 
The consequences of a disagreement are according to article 102, paragraph 2 and 4 that the ‘affected 
part’ of the EEA agreement will be non-functioning. What the affected part is in each case will be 
decided by the EEA Joint Committee. If a solution is not reached at this stage, the affected part of the 
annex will be ‘provisionally suspended’. As it is only a temporarily suspension, the procedure does not 
in any case contain a permanent right of reservation.   
On assignment from The Norwegian Postal Service, a Norwegian law firm
101
 assessed the legal nature 
of the right of reservation. Regarding the legal consequences, they interpreted the question to be 
‘which legal room the EU has to sanction …. And how serious and extensive sanctions can be used’.
102
  
Their assessment was that the legal sanctions, in any case, could not be more extensive than the 
suspended provision entails, because of the principle of proportionality in EEA law.
103
  
Article 102 does not mention legal sanctions. The wording in the article is in fact quite the contrary; it 
explains the procedure for a specific right. If legal consequences that are not in the agreement, shall be 
given for following a right and procedure stated in the agreement, it seems a paradox that the article is 
there at all. 
A use of the right of reservation will result in a lack of homogeneity between EU and EFTA/EEA law, 
which in itself is problematic. Still, as the article gives the right to negotiate, it seems that article 102 is 
supposed to envisage that the states are sovereign. 
The EU ambassador to the ‘European Delegation to Norway’
104
 János Herman, expressed that EU 
reactions might be more far reaching than mentioned in the Norwegian debate and that it would lead 
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us into unknown legal and political territory.
105
 This statement implies that both legal and political 
sanctions may be the result, despite them not being mentioned in the article. 
The official Norwegian comprehension is that the EU cannot legally sanction an EFTA/EEA state for 
use of the right of reservation
106
, since no such sanctions are mentioned in article 102. Political 
measures are more difficult to anticipate. These different comprehensions may be assessed in the light 
of the negotiations for the EEA agreement, consequently resulting in the unclear choice of words in 
article 102. Due to lack of time, the wording became a compromise between the demands from the 
parties. 
In article 3 first paragraph of the EEA agreement, the parties ‘shall  take all appropriate measures… to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Agreement.’ This implies that all parties have a 
duty to be loyal to the agreement.
107
 This principle of loyalty implies that the suspended part shall be 
interpreted in a restrictive way, as pointed out by the organisation ‘No to the EU’ in their comments to 
the report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This argument can be used to protect the aim of 
homogeneity between EU and EEA law. 
Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 2, the parties ‘shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives’. The wording ‘measure’ includes both legal and political 
actions. The paragraph expresses a duty not to take steps that can hurt the cooperation within the 
agreement.  
According to paragraph 3, the parties are obliged to ‘facilitate cooperation within the framework of 
this Agreement.’ This wording also expresses a demand for loyalty. In terms of the reservation 
process, the ‘No to the EU’
108
group stated that this expresses a principle of cooperation that will hinder 
the EU to take measures. 
These three paragraphs favour cooperation leading to an agreement which fulfil the principle of 
homogeneity. There is no alternative direction for the disagreement than to agree, because there are no 
guidelines for how a total reservation may be successful. The consequence is not that the EFTA/EEA 
state can choose not to implement the legislation, only that the parties may negotiate for adjustments. 
After the necessary and agreed adjustments are made, the legislation will enter into force. This is not a 
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‘right of reservation’; it is a right to negotiate for adjustments, which will lead to the implementation 
of the legislation.  
 
3.3.4 Normative assessment of legal criteria 
 
Political aspects will dominate the procedure pursuant to article 102 as there is a lack of legal criteria. 
The political aspects that may interfere during this process are not certain. It will probably depend on 
the character of the directive in question and the relevant interests. 
In order to give the EEA agreement a firm character, there are good arguments that criteria for the 
right of reservation should be established. One possibility would be to have criteria that provided the 
possibility for the EFTA states to reserve themselves against legislation regarding flanking areas to the 
agreement. As these areas were not originally a part of the agreement, the EFTA/EEA states should 
have more room to decide in these matters. On the other hand, the dynamic functioning of the 
agreement was an aim from the start. 
Another possibility would be to have criteria providing a right to reserve the states against legislation 
concerning only the internal market. Since the states’ objective is to benefit the most from the internal 
market and to be treated as EU member states in these areas, the logic consequence would be that the 
need to use the right of reservation would only be invoked where the EU legislation collided with vital 
national interests. This way all EEA states would be treated in the same manner. 
The article as it is today weakens the chances for other states to participate in the EEA agreement.  If 
the EEA agreement became an independent alternative, this could serve the interest of the EU as the 
EEA agreement could be presented as the only other alternative to EU membership. This would be 
more economic and time effective than negotiating individual agreements, as the EU and Switzerland 
has done. 
3.3.5 The Norwegian point of view 
 
The debate in Norway regarding article 102 and the ‘right of reservation’, has been an important factor 
in the debate since the negotiations and signing of the EEA agreement in 1992,
109
 because it represents 
the state sovereignty. From a constitutional perspective, it is of decisive importance that Norway has 
the possibility to reject unwanted regulations.
110
 In the debate in society, the right of reservation has 
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been viewed for many as an excuse when the argument is that too much power has been given to the 
EU. 
Despite this, the right has never been used by any of the contracting parties, though it has been 
discussed several times. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Foreign Minister notified the EU on the 23
rd
 of 
May 2011 that Norway is considering using article 102 in relation to the Third Postal Directive
111
.  In 
Norway, the right of reservation has been more or less debated in relation to 17 directives since the 
agreement entered into force in 1994 and until 2011.
112
 Considering that the number of incorporated 
acts is above 6000
113
, it is clearly evident that the right of reservation plays a relatively minor role. 
The debate has intensified since 2005.
114
 The reasons for this can be several. In the Norwegian report 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
115
 it is suggested than one reason may be that people are tired and 
frustrated with the general dynamics of the EEA agreement. Another could be that mobilisation of 
persons who are engaged in the directives’ consequences
116
 has been successful and that the character 
of the directives in question has been able to create a general interest. Examples are the Data Retention 
Directive
117
 and the Third Postal Directive
118
. 
It is arguably a combination of reasons. As a consequence of an expanding EU, the power is more 
visible in European and international relations. This leads to a growing understanding of what Norway 
is not fully a part of. Added to this is the number of EU acts that have been incorporated into 
Norwegian law since 1994 and the fact that Norway has no influence in the decision-making process. 
The result may naturally be a question of why the right of reservation has not been used, when it is 
supposed to be that available as often presented by some political parties.
119
 
3.3.6 The Data Retention Directive 
 
The Data Retention Directive was published in the Official Journal on the 13
th
 of April 2006. The 
directive gave public authorities the possibility to obtain and store ‘traffic and location data on both 
legal entities and natural persons and to the related data necessary to identify the subscriber or 
                                                          
111
 Joint press statement http://www.eu-
norge.org/Global/SiteFolders/webeu/110629_3rd_postal_directive_statement.pdf accessed 06.04.2012 
112
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ p 103 
113
 Ibid p 104 
114
 Ibid p 104 
115
 Ibid p 105 
116
 Ibid p 105 
117
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L 284 
118
 Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/67/EC with 
regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services [2008] OJ C 307 E 
119
 As an example, the majority in the Labour Party. 
31 
 
registered user’ (article 1 paragraph 2). The directive concerned telephony and internet (article. 5). 
The aim is to make it easier for the public authorities to fight crime and terrorism.
120
 The directive was 
approved in Norwegian Parliament with 89 to 80 votes,
121
 and will be implemented into the EEA 





The Data retention directive created debates in Norwegian society and media. The concern was in 
large the protection of privacy. This was also a concern for several member states, as well as an issue 
recognized by the Commission.
123
 The European Commission is now working on adjustments to the 
directive. 
The reasons why it was not decided to use the right of reservation concerning the data retention 
directive may be numerous. Firstly, the directive only seeks partial harmonisation. Secondly, the 
concerns were general and not able to mobilise a specific group of ‘victims’.  Furthermore, it was 
likely that the directive would be modified after all, because of all the reactions from the member 
states in the EU.  
3.3.7 The Third Postal Directive 
 
The third amending directive to the EU Postal Services was published in 2008 and decided to be EEA 
relevant by the EEA Joint Committee. The intention with the directive is to profit from the internal 
market while liberalising the whole postal sector.
124
  The Third Postal directive will liberalise and open 
the competition for other actors also for letters weighing less than 50 grams. In Norway delivery of 
these letters is often not profitable because of the often difficult geographical location of the recipient. 
Currently this is partly financed through The Norwegian Postal Service and partly by the annual state 
budget because of societal reasons.
125
 
The concerns with the new directive are that the postal services in question will either cease to exist or 
become more expensive. This will affect the whole population, but in particular those who live in rural 
areas. In Norway this is of particular importance due to the Norwegian topography, with mountains 
and fjords making large areas difficult to access. In general it is a governmental aim to secure the 
living conditions in these areas to preserve a diverse population and Norway’s national history. 
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Politics that protect these values have a strong position in Norway. Because of the directive’s potential 
consequence for rural areas, this debate has engaged those who support a strong rural politic in 
general. They fear it will become more difficult to live in such areas than it already is. 
As a result of this debate, a report of the possible consequences of the implementation was drafted on 
behalf of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. In the report the conclusion was that if the 
state aid for delivering in non-profitable areas continues for the Norwegian Postal Service, the Third 
Postal Directive will not affect the distribution service.
126
 
The voting in the Government was equal, leaving the Labour Party with the final decision. At the 
annual meeting within the party
127
, it was a majority for using the right of reservation in this particular 
case. In the biannual report to the Norwegian Storting
128
, the Foreign Minister
129
 concluded that there 
still are concerns, and emphasized that the directive might have a negative effect on working 
conditions and wages in the post sector, based on experience from other states. On the 23
rd
 of May 
2011, the Norwegian Foreign Minister delivered a notice to the EU, concluding that Norway is 
considering using the procedure in article 102 EEA. 
It does not seem that this move has provoked particular interest beyond Norwegian borders. However, 
it is likely that if the procedure continues, attention will be given from those states which are 
considering joining the EEA agreement. 
3.3.8 The European Union point of view 
 
The official report from the meeting on 23rd of May 2011 does not mention the Norwegian 
initiative.
130
 Representatives from the EU and from Norway had the first informal meeting some days 
later
131
 and another one in September.
132
 In the Council Conclusion from November 2011, the Council 
states that ‘…The EEA Council noted the Progress Report of the EEA Joint Committee and, in 
particular (...) noted the importance of maintaining close cooperation between the EU and the EEA 
EFTA States on postal reforms while addressing the concerns on the implementation of the Third 
Postal Directive (2008/6/EC)’. 
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Article 102 of the EEA agreement was not mentioned in the statement, but the ‘close cooperation’ is 
emphasized. This implies that negotiations are accepted, as is the procedure in article 102. The 
potential specific measures are not mentioned. This can imply that no other specific measures will be 
taken except from those found in agreement in the EEA Joint Committee. On the other hand this 
statement could mean that EU has not yet decided how to react. 
3.3.9 Consequences 
 
In the report from the Foreign Ministry, the expert group highlights the probability of countermeasures 
from the EU. 
133
 This is a political assessment. The statement has been criticised, saying that the fact 
that the EU has waited almost one year to answer the Norwegian notice implies the opposite.
134
 
Some positive aspects that may arise from the right of reservation are firstly, that it underlines the 
principal difference from being an EU member state. This is the only provision that justifies the fact 
that the EFTA/EEA states cannot take part in the decisions making. 
Secondly, it will contribute to a substantial EU/EEA debate in the member states. If the right is used, 
the debate about the EEA agreement can be founded on facts, not on how the agreement is supposed to 
function theoretically. 
Third, this provision may safeguard important national interests. If the use is accepted by all parties, 
including the EU, this will contribute to the sustainability of the EEA agreement. 
On the other hand it could first off all harm the agreement itself, if the EU does not have a similar 
comprehension of the article as the EFTA/EEA states. It can be argued that the article does not 
envisage a right to veto, only a negotiation procedure where veto is not an option. 
Secondly, it might harm the political cooperative environment. Concretely, this may result in 
difficulties for the EFTA/EEA states to get the exemptions that they would otherwise get. 
Third, if the use of the right of reservation concerns a particular national interest, the argument about 
the ‘cherry picking’
135
 of the EFTA/EEA states will gain substance. 
4 Influence in the legislative process 
 
                                                          
133
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ p 105 
134
 ‘No to the EU’ – comments on the NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and Outside’ to the chapter about the Right of 
Reservation on page 105 
135





One of the most important differences between being an EU member state or not, is the issue of 
influence in the legislative decision-making process. The legal base for EFTA/EEA influence is the 
EEA agreement article 81, 99, 100 and 101.  
Article 81, 99 and 100 give the EFTA/EEA states the right to participate in preparatory groups related 
to the work of the Commission. Article 101 is a legal basis for participation in other committees. The 
granted right of participation mainly concerns the Commission. When the EEA agreement was signed, 
the Commission was the most important EU organ. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 1
st
 
December 2009, the balance of power between the EU actors has changed. Today, the Commission 
still has vital tasks such as setting the political agenda for the EU as well as the exclusive competence 
of initiating law under the ordinary legislative procedure. However, as an example, the decisive 
legislative power is now given to the Council and the Parliament, (TFEU article 149). The change 
makes influence more difficult for the EFTA/EEA states, as new procedures and networks had to be 
established when the EEA Agreement has not been changed accordingly. 
Despite the lack of updating the EEA Agreement in this regard, there are alternative means of 
influence. For example can the EFTA/EEA States forward their view to the representatives of states 
with whom they have a close cooperative relationship and common interest. For Norway this will for 
example be the other Nordic countries, with which there are also other arenas outside the EU that may 
be used for lobbying. 
Meanwhile, the lack of adaption in the EEA agreement makes the EFTA/EEA influence more difficult 
than what was the objective when the agreement was signed. In the following the aforementioned 
articles and the influence obtained, will be examined. 
4.2 Article 81 
 
The EFTA/EEA states derive the right to participate in Programme Committees from article 81 of the 
EEA agreement.
136
  The Program Committees are under supervision of the Commission. As the name 
implies, the Program Committees shall develop the different programs of the EU. In the period 2007-
2013, the EFTA/EEA states will participate in 16 program committees through the EEA agreement.
137
 
One example is the equal right for students in EFTA/EEA states to benefit from the Erasmus exchange 
program for higher education. 
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According to article 81b, when developing policies in an area where EFTA States contribute 
financially, the EU ‘shall take full account’ of the EFTA contribution. This means that the EFTA 
States have a right to be heard when developing relevant policies. Furthermore in article 81e, the 
‘EFTA States…shall have the same rights and obligations with regard to dissemination, evaluation 
and exploitation of results as those applicable to EC Member States…’ The article secures the right to 
be heard in the same manner as an EU state, when the EFTA/EEA state is participating. 
4.3 Article 99 
 
According to article 99 of the EEA agreement, the EU Commission ‘shall’ consult ‘experts’ from 
EFTA/EEA countries in the drafting of new EU legislation ‘in the same way’ as they seek advice from 
the experts from the EU member states. The wording implies that only if the Commission seeks advice 
from the EU member states, are they obliged to consult the EFTA/EEA experts. This interpretation is 
consistent with the one in the report from the expert group, NOU 2012:2.
138
  In this regard, 
EFTA/EEA states are treated in the same manner as EU member states. 
The national experts are independent experts and do not formally represent their national 
government.
139
 Meanwhile, the experts often come from the national ministries or departments under 
the ministries.
140
 Their experience and advice are not formally the states’ position, though through 
their task of providing the Commission with valuable experience and advice, they may forward their 
states’ position, in order to avoid surprises and problems for the state later in the process.
141
 
Meanwhile, the EFTA/EEA states may only participate as experts in groups that prepare ‘a field which 
is governed’ by the EEA agreement. Today this means that out of approximately 1000 groups, Norway 
as an example, may participate in 300-400 committees.
142
 On one hand, this is a predictable outcome 
of the agreement, as it would not be natural to participate in others. On the other hand, it depends on 
interpretation. If interpreted narrowly, fields that are not mentioned in the agreement but still 
influenced by it will fall outside the scope. Only a realistic approach to the impact of the EEA 
agreement in the EFTA/EEA states will provide influence according to the objective in article 99. 
It is highlighted by the Norwegian expert group that the right to participation as experts is accepted by 
the Commission, but not always well-known among all commissioners and EU member state 
representatives.
143
 This fact leads to the necessity of negotiating the framework of the participation 
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before several of the meetings.
144
 As long as this is a success for the EFTA/EEA state, the legal basis 
is clear and the right to participation should not lead to problems. On the other hand, if the EEA 
Agreement had been amended accordingly, influence would be secure and predictable, not 
coincidental. 
The EU member states are sometimes asked to provide comments when the EU is developing policies. 
If the area is EEA relevant, the EFTA/EEA states will also be asked to provide a written comment.
145
 
Altogether the EFTA/EEA states have sent more than 100 comments, though the annual number has 
decreased in recent years.
146
 
4.4 Article 100 
 
Article 100 in the EEA agreement provides that experts from the EFTA/EEA states shall be granted 
‘as wide a participation as possible according to the areas concerned, in the preparatory stage’, 
where EU member states are also conferred. This preparatory stage is where the comitology 
committees operate.
147
 The comitology committees consist of representatives from the EU member 
states, and they supervise how the Commission effectuates the decisions from the Council and the 
Parliament. The comitology committees ensures that the Commission takes due account of each 
member state. 
Since these committees ‘shall’ be consulted in the preparatory stage of new legislation and therefore 
will influence the decision making process, the EFTA States are only granted observer status.
148
 The 
influence of the EFTA/EEA states in this process is secondary and potential. 
4.5 Article 101 
 
According to this article, the EFTA States shall also be consulted in committees when ‘this is called 
for by the good functioning of this Agreement.’ These committees in question are listed in protocol 
nr.37 to the EEA agreement. From 2009, EFTA/EEA states could participate in 26 groups.
149
 The 
listed groups are mainly concerned with the four freedoms and competition. To secure the good 
functioning of the agreement, these committees should cover not only the four freedoms, but include 
the flanking areas that the EEA agreement influences. 
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4.6 The European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament is composed of representatives elected by referendum from each of the EU 
member states. The Parliament is co-legislator with the Council, and the two organs discuss and adopt 
proposals from the Commission (TFEU article 4). 
Due to the increased role of the Parliament in the EU decision-making process after the Lisbon Treaty, 
channels of information and influence for the EFTA/EEA states had to change. In the preamble of the 
EEA agreement, it says that ‘cooperation between the members of the European Parliament and of the 
Parliaments of the EFTA States’ is desirable. This provides a legal basis for the contact. This contact 
has not been used extensively however, and limits itself to the exchange of information between the 
parliamentary representatives of EFTA, and representatives of the European Parliament.
150
 After the 
Lisbon Treaty, there has been increased contact at a high political level in Norway and the European 
Parliament, as well as the Storting establishing a Brussels office.
151
 Also, a position has been created 
in the Storting administration whose task is to follow the work of the European Parliament, partly 
from Norway and from Brussels.
152
 Even though the representatives of the European Parliament may 
be open to influence, there are many states in addition to the EFTA States who seek to influence the 
elected representatives, and in such a situation it may be difficult to get support for one’s view.
153
  
In relation to the Parliament, being an EFTA/EEA state is clearly different from being an EU member 
state, as they do not have a national representative in the Parliament. The influence is secondary. The 
change in the power structure in the EU is an example of how development in the EU is happening 
without proper amendments in the EEA agreement, which to this date is customized for influencing 
the Commission. The consequence is that the EFTA/EEA states have had no possibility of influencing 
legislation that might become EEA law. 
4.7 The Council 
 
The EU Council is co-legislator with the European Parliament (TFEU article 4). The Council 
coordinates the member states’ economic policy, approves the budget, sign contracts of behalf of the 
EU, coordinates the foreign and defence policy as well as coordination of police forces and the courts 
in the member states.
154
 Thus, the Council is given an important role in the EU system. 
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There is no legal basis in the EEA agreement that secures the EFTA/EEA states influence in the 
different configurations in the Council. In order to obtain information and the possibility of 
influencing the Council, the Nordic EU ambassadors meet once a month before the Council 
meetings.
155
 The state that hosts the rotating Council is also regarded as an important channel of 
influence, which for example Norway tries to influence by accrediting the embassy in the state with 
one extra diplomat during the six months of the presidency.
156
 
Another possibility is to be invited to the informal Council meetings between the ministers, along with 
other non-member states.
157
  Here representatives from other EU organs attend, and there is a 
possibility to make an informal path for national interests if the EFTA/EEA representative in question 
has an active profile and an agenda for the meeting.
158
 
4.8 Independent Committees 
 
The past years have witnessed an expansion in the development of independent EU committees. The 
reasons are both because of the limited capacity of the Commission as well as a necessary separation 
between law and politics in the EU.
159
 The tasks of these committees are both helping in forming EU 
policies as well as supervising the following of the policies, or purely informational work.
160
 
As a starting point, independent committees represent a problem for the EFTA/EEA states, as access 
to these is not granted trough the EEA agreement. If the EFTA/EEA states want to participate, the 
EFTA/EEA states must negotiate a right for each different Committee. This is even the case if the area 
in question is regulated in the EEA agreement.
161
 If the EFTA/EEA states are granted access, it will be 
with observer status only.
162
 
These independent committees may still be an important source of information for the EFTA/EEA 
states. The committees may additionally serve as the connecting point between networks of national 
governments, which the EFTA/EEA states may seek to influence informally. 
4.9 Remarks 
 
The above indicates that legislative powers have been transferred from the EFTA states to the EU 
organs, despite this not being explicitly stated in the EEA Agreement. The EFTA/EEA states are 
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secured a limited amount of influence through the EEA agreement, but this influence is not 
proportional compared to the amount of incorporated EU law in the EFTA States. Another aspect is 
the lack of amendment in the EEA agreement which regulates the right to influence. Consequently, 
more power is given to the EU, and the supranational character of the EEA Agreement becomes even 
more visible. 
When the objective of the agreement pursuant to the preamble, is to establish a ‘dynamic and 
homogenous’ European Economic area, there are no obvious reasons why the legal basis for influence 
in the EEA agreement should not be amended according to the changes in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Amendments would give the EFTA States increased stability and security for their manner of 
influence. Amendments in this regards would make sure the EFTA/EEA states retained the 
sovereignty they had from the beginning. 
The EFTA States have changed their methods of influencing, without demanding a formal update of 
legal basis in the EEA agreement. An updated legal basis should be a natural consequence of changes 
in the EU, as it would not hurt the objective in the agreement. The reason must be a lack of 
willingness, in order not to hurt the political cooperation environment, because the consequences of 
the latter are unpredictable. This is an example of a weak legal procedure, which is arguably harming 
the proper functioning and future of the EEA agreement.  
Thus when the agreement is functioning, the power is executed by a supranational organ whose 
decisions are legally binding. The overall reason for this development is the lack of balanced legal 
criteria and an unequal balance of power between the parties. 
 
 




How the EEA agreement is viewed by other European states will contribute to highlight the character 
of the agreement. Furthermore, if other states assess the EEA agreement as an attractive manner of 
accessing the internal market without the conditions attached to an EU membership, the non-EU 
member states would increase their political power. 
40 
 
Through its 20 years of existence, the EEA agreement has not been an alternative for other European 
states. To be a part of the EEA agreement, one must either be an EU member or a member of EFTA. 
Unlike the EU, there are no entrance criteria to become a member of EFTA. 
As said by the previous Commission President Romano Prodi
163
, the EEA agreement facilitates for its 
contracting parties to be ‘as close to the EU as it is possible to be without being a member.
164
 
Furthermore in relation to the neighbouring states, he emphasized that ‘it is worth seeing what we 
could learn from the way the EEA was set up and then using this experience as a model for integrated 
relations with our neighbours.’ This indicates that the EU has an interest in close cooperation with 
their neighbouring countries and that the EEA agreement can be the right tool. At the same time, as we 
have seen the EEA agreement might result in more homogeneity than predicted at the first glance. In 
the following it will therefore be assessed how the EEA agreement would fit as an alternative model 
for some of the other states in Europe. The states that will be examined are chosen as a result of their 
own assessments of a change in their relationship with the EU or that they have openly expressed that 
the EEA seems to be an interesting alternative. 
5.2 Switzerland 
 
Switzerland was part of the negotiations for the EEA agreement in 1990-1991, but the agreement was 
rejected by a referendum in 1992.
165
 By their unwillingness to lose parts of their sovereignty but at the 
same time acknowledging the EU as an important trade partner, Switzerland has chosen an alternative 
between EU membership and the EEA agreement. The latter is a relationship consisting of bilateral 
free trade agreements; the first free trade agreement from 1972 (‘Bilateral I’), a series of agreements 
from 1999 (‘Bilateral II’) and agreements from 2004. In sum, there are over 120 agreements which 
substantially cover almost the same as the EEA agreement.
166
 As an example, ‘Bilateral I’ covers free 
movement of persons and goods, as well as research, transport and public procurement. The character 
of the agreements is diverse; some are static while others obligate Switzerland to incorporate new 
relevant regulations and directives, meaning they are dynamic. 
The most important difference from the EEA agreement is firstly that there are no common permanent 
institutions.  Conflicts are solved by one of the 27 ad-hoc committees. These committees do not have 
deadlines nor are they under an obligation to deliver a decision.
167
 
5.2.1 Points of view from the EU 
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Already after the negative referendum of the EEA agreement in 1992, the Commission stated that ‘it 
would be inappropriate for Switzerland to obtain all the advantages of an Agreement which it has 
rejected’.
168
  The comment reveals a restrictive attitude towards the expansion of this trade 
relationship. At the same time it signals to third parties that this kind of trade relationship is restricted 
both in substance and in accessibility. 
The EU’s concern regarding the lack of a permanent institutional structure and its consequences was 
confirmed on the Councils meeting in Brussels 2010. The report from the meeting stated that the 
cooperation has ‘turned in the course of the years into a highly complex set of multiple agreements. 
Due to a lack of efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis including ECJ case-law, 
and for ensuring the supervision and enforcement of the existing agreements, this approach does not 
ensure the necessary homogeneity in the parts of the internal market and of the EU policies in which 




From this statement, it is not clear which solution the EU envisages for Switzerland.  If a solution to 
ensure the ‘necessary homogeneity’ shall be sought in the already existing possible legal models, 
Switzerland must either become an EU member or an EFTA member. An alternative is to establish a 
Court on a permanent basis to supervise the current FTAs. Considering that the substance of the 
agreements is already close to covering as much as the EEA agreement, a permanent institutional 
structure will position it even closer. The question however arises if this will be profitable for the EU. 
5.2.2 The view from Switzerland 
Though the EU has several times acknowledged that they are not completely satisfied with the 
situation, Switzerland has been content. Meanwhile, as a result of the Council’s recent and several 
comments, Switzerland is now communicating that they are willing to look for other alternatives, 
according to a recent report.
170
 In the report the relationship with the EU is examined based on three 
criteria from the Swiss side
171
. The criteria are firstly that Switzerland shall have co-decision making 
power and retain sufficient room for deciding its own policies. Secondly, the EU shall remain willing 
to co-operate and to find bilateral solutions. Last, the economic framework conditions shall not change 
to Switzerland’s disadvantage. In principle, these criteria exclude both EU membership and EEA 
membership, because Switzerland demands co-legislation power. 
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When the Swiss report is evaluating alternatives, the EEA agreement is assessed as an attempt ‘to 
unite two contradictory objectives’
172
, the legislative autonomy and the homogeny principle. Judging 
from the report, EEA membership does not seem likely as a Swiss option, mostly reasoned by the lack 
of influence on the decision-making process.  
5.2.3 Reflections on this arrangement  
Several arguments favour that the existing arrangement should be satisfactory, taking into 
consideration that the trade relationship consists of free trade agreements between sovereign parties. 
On the other hand, EU law is sui generis, and does not have the characteristics of other international 
law constructions, which FTAs usually are based upon.  The reason for the EEA agreement not being 
comparable to other international agreements is the nature of EU law with direct effect and supremacy. 
As a consequence, EU law operates slightly different in Switzerland than in the EU member states. A 
structure with ad-hoc committees serves as an effective system to solve problems related to the 
application of EU law in Switzerland. The lack of permanent institutions is strengthened by the fact 
that not all agreements between the EU and Switzerland are of a dynamic nature, making the 
supervision of the agreements even more important.  
As many of the agreements are linked together with a so-called ‘guillotine’ clause; the termination of 
one agreement may lead to the termination of several.
173
 If changes shall be made within the current 
framework, new agreements must be negotiated.   
In this arrangement, Switzerland has retained its sovereignty and treats the EU as any other 
international partner. At the same time, problems attached to the specific nature of the EU become 
visible, as for example lacking direct effect to ensure the same application of EU rules within 
Switzerland. Even though this relationship has been satisfactory for many years, due to the 
characteristics of EU law, the arrangement has failed to become a permanent success. The relationship 
is therefore about to change.  
EU membership is portrayed as more attractive than the EEA agreement in the official report from 
Switzerland. In terms of influence, the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise Switzerland as a 
medium-sized state, but emphasizes that experience shows that even small states may have ‘an 
influence that extends beyond their numerical representation in EU bodies.’
174
 Given the fact that 
Switzerland is the current EFTA state most reluctant to transfer sovereignty, it is worth noticing that 
EU membership is regarded as more favourable than the EEA agreement. 
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A result of the parties’ reports is that the European Commission and the Swiss Government in July 
2010 put together a working group to find a mutual more beneficial solution.
175
 To enter an agreement 
which is almost identical to the EEA Agreement, would give signals from the EU that every state have 
the possibility for an individual agreement. This would cost a large amount of resources for the EU, 
and it is doubtful that it will serve their interest. As the Swiss people are euro-sceptics in general,
176
 
the outcome is not definite. The solution will in either way contribute to the EU debate in Europe, and 
in particular to the debate in Norway and Liechtenstein, bearing in mind the potential Icelandic EU 
membership. 
5.3 The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom started the negotiations for EC membership in 1961, but it was not until the 
French president Charles de Gaulle withdrew as president in 1969 that the UK was politically accepted 
and became a member state in 1973. President de Gaulle had the opinion that the UK had a “deep-
seated hostility” and “lack of interest” towards the European Community, and that their economy was 
too different to fit into the European model.
177
 
5.3.1 Exemptions and consequences 
It is possible that president de Gaulle made a point regarding the lack of interest. Since 1973, the UK 
has obtained several opt-outs from important developments in the EU. One example is the opt-out 
clause in the Maastricht Treaty of 7
th
 February 1992 regarding the common currency. This clause 
states that the’ powers of the UK are the field of monetary policy which are not affected by the 
Treaty’.
178
 As a consequence, the UK retains the pound sterling and the power of devaluation, thus 
retaining a great part of their sovereignty in the monetary sector. This is different from, as an example, 
the’ political opt-out’ from the EU Charter of Human Rights. The EU Charter in large codifies 
principles that are already established through case law, and to which all member states are bound, 
leaving the opt-out without substance to a wide extent. 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron refused to take a part in the formation of a new financial treaty to 
regulate the member states economy due to the euro crisis. Although he had support in the UK and 
from his Conservative Party, he received criticism from his EU colleagues. French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy characterised the veto as ‘unacceptable’. 
179
 This refusal is the last of many opt-outs during 
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the past years, revealing a strong tendency not to willingly integrate as originally agreed. At the same 
time, the debate regarding EU membership has increased the past years. 
In a speech
180
 given by David Cameron, he stated that ‘We’ve a right to ask what the European Union 
should and shouldn’t do……and change it accordingly…. An opportunity to begin to refashion the EU 
so it better serves this nation’s interests…’  This statement expresses the view that the UK has an 
independent position in the EU. This is per definition not correct. New laws are decided between the 
Council and the European Parliament to whom also the UK has transferred legislative powers. The UK 
has the identical opportunities as the other member states to participate in and influence the EU organs 
in this process. Furthermore will exemptions be contrary to the nature of EU membership. As an EU 
member, acceptance is given to the EU as sole legislator; sovereignty has been transferred to the EU. 
There is no clause in the TEU/TFEU stating that transfer of sovereignty can be withdrawn. The UK 
must as a starting point abide by the result of the majority according to the voting rules. 
Furthermore, exemptions and opt-outs may negatively influence the political environment, which is an 
important factor within the EU. In these terms, it cannot be excluded that the exemptions may have 
long-term consequences. 
A final point is that David Cameron wants to ‘refashion’ the relationship with EU. What this means is 
uncertain, but it implies that we may expect some changes in the EU-UK relationship in the future. 
5.3.2 Future alternatives and debate in society 
The Prime Minister has said that ‘Leaving the EU is not in our national interest’. Furthermore he has 
stated that; ‘Outside, we would end up like Norway, subject to every rule for the single market made in 
Brussels but unable to shape those rules.’
181
 By his comments, David Cameron criticizes the position 
the EFTA/EEA countries may in practice be subject to.  
Altogether, it is not clear what David Cameron views as the best position for the UK in relation to the 
EU, at this point, he argues both the opportunity to get exemptions for what is not in the UK’s interest, 
and for retaining UK’s influence. As David Cameron speaks on behalf of ‘we sceptics,’
182
  a reduction 
of the EU ties is maybe what he and the Conservative party wants. The opinion of the people, the 
decisive factor in the end, is not clear.  
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In the article ‘Tiptoing Out’
183
, the columnist Martin Huchtinson is of the opposite opinion to 
Cameron. Hutchinson states that the ‘UK would be a natural’ partner to the EEA agreement. 
Regarding ‘the City’
184
, he says that strictly euro-zone matters will leave the UK anyway.  His view is 
supported by other columnists in the field. Justin Stares points out that with only EEA membership, 
the fishery policy, agricultural policy and the common defence policy will be left outside the EU 
sphere, ‘all detested by some eurosceptics.’
185
 Furthermore it is emphasized that in addition to the four 
basic freedoms, the UK could cooperate with the EU in other voluntarily areas, as well as the 
economic support the UK would be expected to give would be less. It is correct that for example 
agriculture and fisheries are not a part of the EEA agreement. Meanwhile, it is more to the EEA than 
the four freedoms. 
On the other side, it is uncertain how the EU would react to a change of UK’s status. According to the 
TFEU article 46 paragraph 5 a, member states can withdraw from membership of the EU. Meanwhile, 
there are no established procedures for downgrading a membership to a free trade agreement or to only 
EEA participation. As the UK has not formally launched a wish to do so, no signals have come from 
the EU in this matter. 
The reaction of the current EFTA/EEA states towards UK participation may be presumed positive. All 
the states have generally a steady and positive relationship with the UK, as well as the UK being a 
powerful state which would contribute to the institutional system, making both the administrative and 
financial burden lighter. Also the UK would provide the EFTA block with more political power. One 
negative aspect is that the UK could have too much power compared to the other states, making the 
necessary cooperation and unanimity, difficult. 
The question regarding the EEA agreement has not been thoroughly examined at UK governmental 
level. At the moment it is clear that the UK is not entirely satisfied with the situation, but the EEA 
debate seems to end at the influence issue. The UK has always been a great power in Europe, 
alongside France and Germany.  The chances that the UK will reduce it possibility of influence and 
power are therefore small. 
5.4 The European small territorial states 
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In the Council’s 2010 conclusions, the EU view is that the relationship with the microstates should be 
towards the ‘progressive integration into the internal market’.
186
 In the following it will be assessed 
whether the EEA agreement would be an appropriate legal model in this relation for the micro states, 
as well as for the Faroes. 
5.4.1 San Marino 
In February 2011, the Department of Foreign Affairs in San Marino published a report on their 
relationship with the EU.
187
 Currently it consists of bilateral trade agreements. In the report, the EEA 
agreement is not mentioned explicitly, but a common solution for the micro states is desirable. 
This signalled that the EEA agreement has been found not to be an appropriate tool for the needs of 
the micro state. On the other hand, the report does not state specifically why the EEA would not be 
appropriate. In any case, EEA membership for San Marino does not seem likely in the near future. 
5.4.2 The Faros 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Faroes assessed in 2010 how to build the most beneficial 
relationship with the EU.
188
 The Faros are not a state, but they have self-governance under Denmark. 
When Denmark became an EU member in 1973, the Faros chose to remain outside, resulting in being 
treated as a third country in relation to the EU.
189
 
Legally, the Faros cannot become a party the EEA agreement, as it demands either EU membership or 
EFTA membership. Denmark is already an EU member, and therefore the Faros cannot become an EU 
or an EFTA member. Meanwhile, ‘The Foreign Policy Powers Act of 2005’ allows for EFTA 
membership as a part of Denmark in respect of the Faros.
190
  The latter is dependent though on the 




For the Faroes, EEA membership will be positive to the education and business sector, but it will also 
bring an economic and administrative burden.
192
 This detailed examination of consequences suggests 
that EFTA and EEA participation are presented as realistic alternatives. 
                                                          
186
 Para 9 
187
 Secretariat of State for Foreign and Political Affairs of the Republic of San Marino ‘Summary of the final  
report prepared by the Technical Group for the Assessment of new Policies for the Integration with the 
European Union San Marino’ February 2011 
188
 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Faroes ‘The Faroes and the EU - possibilities and challenges in a future 
relationship’ May 2010 
189
 Ibid p 9 
190
 Ibid p 53 
191
 Ibid p 53 
192
 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Faroes ‘The Faroes and the EU - possibilities and challenges in a future 
relationship’ May 2010, p 54 
47 
 
The report recognises that Norway and Iceland are positive to a Faroese EFTA membership, while 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein are not.
193
 The political situation may thus hinder the participation, not 
the legal character of the agreement itself. 
5.4.3 Andorra 
Andorra and the EU currently have a Customs union.
194
  The relationship also consist of a Cooperation 
agreement from 2004; the latter without substantial results.
195
 Andorra’s currency is the euro,
196
 as 
well as they de facto are Schengen members, and have a taxation agreement.
197
 
In 2007, the relationship and the possibilities for substantial development between Andorra and the 
EU were presented in a research from the Andorran Minister of Foreign Affairs.
198
 The background for 
this report was the growth of Andorran economy, and that policies and programs within the EU could 
contribute to this growth.
199
 In order to benefit from the EU on a future and sustainable term, Andorra 
expects to have to take part in the four freedoms.
200
   
Several options for cooperation with the EU are discovered in the research. Andorra evaluates the 
Swiss model as an alternative. Meanwhile, Andorra acknowledges the EU point of view that a Swiss 




The EEA agreement is regarded as interesting, especially due to the fact that Liechtenstein, which is of 
the same size as Andorra, has managed the structure of the EEA agreement. Meanwhile, ‘the EEA 
Treaty, of 1992, has since been overtaken by important developments in the EU’s economic policies 
falling outside the precise internal market agenda of the EEA ….looking ahead for a model for the 
next decade, the EEA could be viewed as both too much (excessive detail with the 1,000 directives) 
and too little (in excluding new areas of EU policies).
202
 The EEA agreement is thus evaluated not too 
detailed in one way and not detailed enough in the other. In sum, the EEA agreement is not an 
attractive future constellation for Andorra, who is aiming for an integrated future with the EU. 
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Full EU membership is also a possibility, but only ‘with a special institutional arrangement to avoid 
congestion in EU decision-making.’
203
 A so-called ‘virtual membership’ could be a possibility around 
2020.
204
 A membership arrangement like this does not have a precedent. EU membership with a 
separate institutional arrangement, have similarities to the EEA agreement and the EFTA institutions. 
It is questionable if such an arrangement would be in the interest of the EU, when the EEA agreement 
can offer a set of well-functioning criteria. 
It is worth noticing that the EEA agreement is not a future alternative for Andorra because of the 
dynamics of the agreement, despite Andorra being a small country, comparable to existing parties.   
5.5 Remarks on the EEA agreement as an alternative model 
 
Today there are several indications that the non-member states in Europe are open-minded regarding 
their relationship towards the EU. In other relations it is the EU who signalises change. In comparison 
with the existence until now, the EEA agreement may substantially change in terms of increase or 
decrease, comparable only to when the previous EFTA States left the EEA agreement in 1995. 
It appears to be a difference between how the large and powerful states estimate the agreement, and 
the approach of the smaller states. It seems that the EEA agreement is not an alternative for the bigger 
states due to the lack of decisive influence. The latter does not seem to be decisive for the smaller 
states, as the influence is hardly mentioned in the reports from the micro-states. 
Furthermore, the agreement is both too extensive and too underdeveloped. The reason is that the legal 
structure in the EEA Agreement has not been strong enough to secure a predictable future of 
integration favouring the EFTA States. 
If the EFTA block was to have a new large member state, the influence on the EU could increase. It is 
likely that the political power of the non-EU member states in the EEA area would increase. 
Additionally, if one state joins it will be likely that others would also evaluate as the agreement as 
sufficient. If larger states were to join, a stronger legal character is likely to be demanded, which again 
would benefit all existing members. 
New members of EFTA and the EEA must be approved by the EEA Council.
205
 In general, Norway 
does not favour the entrance of the micro-states.
206
 The Norwegian Foreign Minister said in his annual 
                                                          
203
 Ibid p 4 
204
 Ibid p 27 
205
 EEA agreement art.128 
206
 NOU 2012:2 ‘Inside and outside’ p 313 
49 
 
speech to the Storting in May 2011
207
, that accession ‘would not be appropriate for these states’. One 
of the reasons given was that ‘Their needs and capacities differ from Norway’s.’ It is true that their 
interests may differ from Norwegian interests. Norway is by far the biggest actor of the EFTA/EEA 
states with its approximately 5 million inhabitants. This is also visible when decisions are made within 
the EFTA pillar, where Norway tends to dominate.
208
 Despite its small size and population in a global 
perspective, Norway has got resources and engagement worldwide, comparable to other important 
actors. This is a part of the reason why further association with the European micro-states will not be 
beneficial for Norway in a global perspective.
209
 
If Iceland accesses the EU, the EFTA/EEA pillar is left with Liechtenstein and Norway. In this case, 
the administrative structure in the EFTA Court and the Joint Committee must change. If this happens, 
maybe there will be a place for a new micro-state after all. 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The aspects discussed above, reveals the difference between formal and real application of the articles 
in the EEA Agreement. This research reveals that the legal structure in the EEA Agreement has the 
ability to let homogeneity prevail before sovereignty, and even to introduce constitutional principles in 
order to obtain the homogeny aim. In the following, some suggestions in order to unite the formal and 
real application of the EEA Agreement will be presented. 
 
6.1 Conditions 
The core of the identified problem is that the principle of homogeneity seems to prevail in the majority 
of case law from the EFTA Court. This is problematic due to the formal approach of the EFTA states, 
which is sovereignty and dualism. 
The question is why this weakness should be solved, as the Agreement has sustained for 20 years. The 
answer is that for the first time, there are implications that the composition of the EFTA block may 
change, and EU’s reaction remains uncertain because of the lack of legal regulation in the agreement. 
As Norway and presumably Liechtenstein still want to participate in the EEA agreement, its legal 
structure is vital in order to predict the future. 
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Another consequence which should favour legal amendments also from the EU is the fact that when 
the EEA agreement is not amended according to all changes in the EU treaty, it is not certain that legal 
development in the Community is reflected within the EFTA States. As a result, the internal market 
rules in the EEA agreement may not be the same internal market rule as within the EU.
 210
 This means 
that the reluctance against having detailed legal obligations to ensure homogeneity, may actually have 




6.2 Reflecting original expectations 
One possibility is that the EEA agreement should reflect what the original comprehensions were. As a 
first step, the principle of sovereignty should be secured through a legal basis both in the EEA 
agreement and in the SCA. In this manner, the EFTA Court would have the mandate to equally 
balance the aim of homogeneity and the sovereignty. If the use of the right of reservation is accepted 
by the EU, thus letting the EFTA states decide not to implement the Third Postal Directive without 
legal or political counter measures, it may serve as an incentive to amend the agreement in this 
manner. 
The independence of the EFTA Court should be codified, preventing the constant search for 
legitimacy from the ECJ. Instead, it would serve the EFTA states in a better manner if the EFTA Court 
took the special nature of the EEA Agreement into consideration. As long as there is a court to ensure 
the dynamic application of EU law, the EFTA Court will function according to its purpose.  
Furthermore, article 81, 99, 100, 101 regarding the possibility for the EFTA states to influence the 
decision making process, should be amended accordingly to the changes from the Lisbon Treaty. If the 
EEA agreement was dynamic in this respect, the EFTA states would at all times have the influence 
which was accepted in the original negotiations. 
 
6.3 Reflecting reality 
The other possibility is to let the EEA agreement reflect its reality. Consequently, there should be a 
provision stating that direct effect is applicable where needed to obtain homogeneity in the entire 
European Economic Area. 
Seen from an EFTA point of view, a formal acceptance of direct effect could challenge their dualist 
approach and the EFTA states would not completely retain their formal sovereignty. From a political 
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point of view, this might lead to debates whether the state should still participate in the agreement, and 
perhaps a referendum regarding the participation in the EEA agreement. In the event of a negative 
referendum, the EFTA states would probably have to withdraw. This is likely to be the reason behind 
the inexplicit use of direct effect in case law, in order not to encourage this process. If the latter is 
correct, it means that the EFTA judges are not completely impartial from their home state, which is a 
breach of SCA article 30. 
Furthermore, article 6 in the EEA agreement should be updated so as to comprise all ECJ decisions, 
not only those prior to the signing of the EEA agreement. The situation today, is that the EU member 
states are legally obliged to follow ECJ decisions; there is no equivalent in the EEA agreement. At 
first glance, the EFTA/EEA states are left with a margin of appreciation, supported by the mere 
existence of the EFTA Court. However, in practice there is no margin of appreciation; de facto, the use 
of ECJ decisions by the EFTA Court is so extensive that it could hardly have been a significant 
difference if there was a legal obligation to follow all ECJ case law completely. However, if article 6 
had included the obligation to follow all ECJ rulings, the existence of the EFTA Court could arguably 
be questioned. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
If the above proposals could lead to unpredictable counter measures or perhaps a termination of the 
agreement, it means that the EEA agreement is not strong enough to tackle its own consequences. It is 
likely that the present legal conditions are results of the historic conditions at the time; the fear of 
being left out from the internal market.  For Norway, this was combined with the negative referendum 
to EU membership in 1972, and that an EU membership seemed unlikely. Because it was arguably 
more important to secure cooperation with the fastest growing power in Europe than to fully secure 
one’s own independent position, the EEA agreement arguably consists of too many compromises from 
the EFTA side.  
This examination has revealed that in order to obtain homogeneity between the applications of EEA 
law in the EFTA States and within the EU, the EFTA States’ sovereignty has lost more territory than 
originally expected. In this context, the result of the process regarding article 102 and the Third Postal 
Directive is both uncertain and important. From the above examinations it cannot be expected that the 
procedure in article 102 will be followed according to the Norwegian comprehension. However, what 
one may conclude from the negotiations and procedures to come, will be decisive in order to 
understand the reality of article 102 and thus the character of the EEA Agreement. Due to the fact that 
legal sanctions are not mentioned in this article, the use of sanctions will be a proof of how politics 
and power between the parties are the decisive factors governing the EEA Agreement. 
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The way other European states evaluate the EEA Agreement confirms the weak position of the EFTA 
block. If the EEA Agreement was a strong and predictable legal agreement, the agreement should be 
more attractive as an alternative for other European States when it gives access to the internal market 
without being EU-members. As this study reveals, there is no state that seem to have the EEA 
Agreement as their first choice when it comes to their EU-relationship. This is due to the fact that its 
unpredictable legal structure impairs the possibility for the EEA Agreement to be recognized as a real 
alternative to EU membership. Consequently, the parties to the EEA Agreement will probably remain 
the same as they are today as long as the agreement sustains. As expressed by Andorra, the EEA 
Agreement is both too narrow and too extensive. 
Will the EEA Agreement sustain? As the above indicates, the answer will not rely on the legal 
structure of the Agreement but on the will to cooperate between the parties. For the EU, the 
Agreement will most likely sustain as long as it serves their interest while being beneficial, as it has 
been the last 20 years. The EFTA States on the other hand, has already agreed to more 
supranationality than originally expected, as the aforementioned discussions on principles, case law 
and influence reveal. There is a difference between formality and reality. What could jeopardize the 
Agreement from the EFTA side is perhaps a public discussion on this topic. The latter may happen 
relating to the Third Postal Directive and article 102. If this difference is set on the public agenda, the 
EFTA governments might be pressured to demand more sovereignty from the EU, a demand with 
unknown consequences. The other alternative is perhaps to renegotiate the Agreement if both parties 
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